Lessons From Lebanon:
Rubble Removal and
   Explosive Ordnance Disposal
The insight and knowledge gained from rubble removal and explosive ordnance disposal in the
Nahr el-Bared Camp, which was destroyed during heavy fighting in Lebanon in 2007, could greatly
benefit future reconstruction efforts in war-damaged urban areas.
by Erik K. Lauritzen [ Lauritzen Advising ]

Part of the war-damaged Nahr el-Bared Camp in northern Lebanon, prior to the start of the rubble-removal project
(August 2008).
All photos courtesy of the author.
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management of NBC’s rubble-removal and EOD projects. Following this agreement, UNDP signed a fixedprice, time-constrained (with penalties for missing
deadlines) contract with the construction and demolition company Al-Jihad for Commerce and Contracting

Figure 1. Outline of the planned reconstruction of 20 ha
(50 ac) divided into eight packages, starting with the reconstruction of package one, progressing in numerical order and
ending with the completion of package eight.
Figure courtesy of UNDP and UNRWA.
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Integrated Rubble Removal and EOD Process

The integrated rubble removal and EOD work involved

• Demolishing structures on and removing rubble from
work sites

• Loading rubble onto trucks and transporting it from the
work site to the laydown area for final inspection and
additional UXO survey4

• Transporting rubble declared free of explosives by HI to
the final disposal area

UXO removal or destruction as needed.

• At the natural ground level, the EOD team performed a
survey of the newly exposed surface.

• Any additional UXO found was removed or destroyed, and remaining rubble at the natural ground
level was removed.

• HI certified the surface UXO clearance and LMAC approved the clearance in accordance with IMAS.
EOD team leaders moved UXO considered to be safe to

Each of HI’s four EOD teams included a team leader and

a central UXO demolition site in an open concrete bunker

four UXO operators. The EOD and rubble-removal teams

and destroyed it by detonation. UXO considered unsafe to

worked together to remove all rubble layer by layer and clear

move was destroyed on-site. On-site detonation temporar-

UXO until the terrain’s surface was reached and cleared. The

ily closed the area, stopping all activities and resulting in

following procedures were used:

worker evacuation.

• EOD teams visually surveyed the work area before
entering.

• UXO was removed and/or marked for destruction on site.
• The rubble-removal team used machines to gradually
clear the area to the natural ground level, stopping for

By the end of the work in September 2009, a total of 11,348
items were found. Excluding weapons and small-arms ammunition, approximately 2,500 (22 percent) were hazardous
explosive items. Figure 2 and Table 1 present UXO details
and distribution.

Figure 2. Sketch of NBC indicating location of UXO found in the Palestinian Refugee Camp of Naher el Bared
by the end of August 2009.
Figure courtesy of UNDP, UNRWA and Handicap International.
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personnel did not respect the safety rules. Additionally, due to

Cooperation and Conflicting Interests
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EOD contractor to ensure NBC’s successful recovery and reconstruction. However, at the project’s inception, the partners

Security, Health and Safety

The project’s successful implementation depended on

did not fully understand the methodology of cooperation and

overall security in north Lebanon. During the implementation

team building essential to working in the field.
The EOD contractors’ prioritization of safety in a time-

period, the situation was calm: No serious incidents occurred

variable contract and the rubble-removal contractor’s prior-

with no negative environmental impact on the work. According

itization of work speed due to a fixed-price, time-restricted

to the UNRWA-UNDP agreement, UNDP and UNRWA were

contract were in disaccord, causing frustration and conflicts

responsible for the safety and security of the UNDP project-

of interest throughout the project. The rubble-removal con-

management unit. UNRWA was responsible for the safety of

tractor allegedly did not understand the requirement of ar-

all UNDP staff on a daily basis within NBC, while UNRWA

moring the machines and providing personal protection

managed the relationship with NBC authorities, including the

equipment for demolition workers. Moreover, the EOD con-

military and the EOD contractor. UNDP was responsible for

tractor often claimed that the rubble-removal contractor’s

the planning and management of health and safety on-site.
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Table 1. Items of UXO found each month according to Handicap International’s report from October 2008 to September 2009.
Table courtesy of author/CISR.
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Success Criteria
• The rubble removal shall be completed in such a way that the respective areas are cleared
and ready for construction works in accordance with the reconstruction project’s time plan.
• Neighbors must be satisﬁed, and the number of claims by neighbors must be low.
• No serious accidents should occur.
• The greatest possible amount of rubble will be recycled and reused for the beneﬁt of the
NBC reconstruction project, and the smallest possible amount of materials will be disposed
of at public landﬁll sites.
• The project should deploy a large number of local, NBC people.
• No negative discussions should be in the media.
• No additional costs should be incurred.
Figure 3. Success criteria of the NBC rubble-removal project.
Figure courtesy of the author/CISR.

The rubble-removal contractor presented a comprehensive
health-and-safety plan, which included occupational health
and work-safety precautions.
The EOD contractor was responsible for overall EOD and
rubble-removal safety and managed the risk of uncontrolled
UXO detonation in accordance with IMAS.
LAF controlled access to NBC and supervised on-site activities. The access procedures were somewhat problematic
at the start of the project; however, thanks to very successful
cooperation between the project partners and LAF, the daily
work on-site ran smoothly throughout the project’s duration.
Because of the high risk of uncontrolled UXO detonation,
the EOD teams and the rubble-removal teams followed specific requirements in accordance with LMAC’s accreditation
of the EOD contractor’s work procedures. The most important
safety rules were as follows:

• All personnel on the work site were required to wear
personal protective equipment, which included a helmet
with an eye screen and a body vest.

• All machines operating on-site needed protection with
armor and safety glass.

• The required safety distance between the machines and
Figure 4. NBC risk assessment by MAG. UXO-contaminated
zones: Red area—heavy density (50 to 125 units of UXO per
hectare) and possible five unexploded 250 kg air bombs; Amber area—normal density (13-49 units of UXO per hectare);
Green area—light density (6–12 units of UXO per hectare).
Figure courtesy of MAG, Risk Assessment Report, April 2008.

teams was 100 m (109 yd).

• The required safety distance between unprotected personnel and machines was 250 m (273 yd).

• All personnel working on site were provided information
and UXO awareness training by the EOD contractor.

• Before entering the site, all personnel were required
to report to the EOD contractor’s checkpoint and be
registered.
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During the rubble-removal project,
uncontrolled UXO detonations caused
seven accidents. One was very serious:
A detonation hit two rubble-removal
workers who were sorting waste and
rubble. One of the workers was severely
wounded, hospitalized for several days
and was unable to work for five to six
months. All critical accidents took place
within the project’s first four months.
No accidents were reported after February 2009.

Deminers search for UXO amidst concrete rubble and iron bars.

Besides the accidents, a total of eight

safe distances, wearing personal protec-

a mandatory precondition for an effec-

uncontrolled explosions were reported,

tion equipment, etc. In the future, it is

tive and successful result.

but they did not cause injury. The inci-

recommended that rubble-removal con-

Establishing the complete project

dents involved small explosive items,

tracts and EOD contracts be merged,

organization at the project’s start is re-

such as hand grenades. These items

either with a shared set of contractual

quired, and all planning documents,

detonated either when machines hit un-

conditions or linked together under full

including work plans, health-and-safety

discovered UXO or during loading or

control of one project manager.

management plans, as well as the quali-

unloading of rubble (i.e., when UXO in

Further, rubble removal and EOD

the rubble fell to the bottom steel plate

are based on different working cul-

of a truck).

tures. Rubble-removal, demolition and

Four air bombs (two 250-kg and

building-waste management are part of

two 400-kg bombs) were found and

the construction sector, while EOD has

handed over to LAF. Considerable ef-

roots in the military sector and is per-

forts were made to find the fifth bomb,

formed under the terms of the emer-

but documentation of reported unex-

gency or development sector. The two

ploded bombs was very poor. It was

work routines and cultures should be

concluded that only four bombs were

integrated at all levels. Emphasis should

among the rubble.

be placed on team building and mutual
understanding between the two contac-

Lessons Learned

The NBC rubble-removal project

tors in order to avoid conflicts of interest
regarding speed and safety.

demonstrated that clearing war-dam-

The history and timing of the NBC

aged buildings containing UXO is both

rubble-removal project demonstrated

challenging and risky. Seven accidents

that this type of project requires detailed

and eight uncontrolled detonations dur-

and careful planning together with

ing the clearance of the 200,000 sq m (50

highly professional project management

ac) urban area were reported.

and control.

Splitting the overall rubble-removal
project into two separate contracts—a

Recommendations

fixed-price, rubble-removal contract

Removal of destroyed buildings

and a time-variable, EOD contract—was

contaminated with UXO requires inte-

not appropriate. The project setup with

grated management of rubble-removal

respect to the cooperation between the

work and EOD work. Mutual under-

two contractors was problematic, espe-

standing of the work and associated

cially regarding safety-measure plan-

risks, together with open cooperation

ning and control, such as maintaining

between the two types of contractors, is

ty-management plan, must be available
from the beginning.
See endnotes page 66
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